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ESSAY
THE CHANGING MARKET FOR CRIMINAL
LAW CASEBOOKS
Jens David Ohlin*
Introduction
Criminal law is a nasty business. The field takes as its point of departure
the indignities that human beings visit upon each other—each one worse
than the one before. A book or article about criminal law often reads like a
parade of horribles, an indictment of humanity’s descent into moral weak-
ness. For those who teach criminal law, everything else pales in comparison.
Neither the business disputes of contract law nor the physical injuries de-
scribed in a torts casebook can compare with the depravity of what we teach
in criminal law. Criminal law professors are often addicted to their subject.
Nothing else matches its intensity and despair; by comparison, teaching a
private law course can seem unreal to the criminal law junkie. Although we
often hate the material because of what it represents, I do not know a single
teacher of criminal law who is ambivalent about the subject. Teaching crimi-
nal law inspires a level of intellectual commitment bordering on obsession.
Criminal law professors are equally passionate about their teaching ma-
terial. They use a variety of different styles in the classroom, and what works
for one professor and his or her students may not necessarily work for an-
other. This is not an indictment of any casebook, but simply a logical impli-
cation of pedagogical pluralism. There are multiple avenues for developing a
rich and profound understanding of the criminal law, and it is unclear
whether the current offerings in the field respond adequately to the needs of
every professor. The question then arises whether there is room in the mar-
ket for a new casebook that structures the learning materials in a new way.
In the following Review, I analyze the leading criminal law casebooks on
the market and describe the ways in which they do—and do not—respond
to the needs of criminal law teachers. At least part of the issue is the chang-
ing nature of law teaching—what actually happens in the classroom has
changed in the last three decades. Moreover, there may be less uniformity in
classroom practice than in the past; in other words, what works in one law
school might not work in another, due in part to the changing profile of law
students, as well as the great diversity of intellectual perspectives that law
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teachers bring to the lectern.1 I then lay out a vision for a new casebook in
criminal law that responds to some of these desiderata with a fresh yet flexi-
ble approach.2
I. The State of the Field
At the moment, a few offerings dominate the field. In 1962, Sanford
Kadish published Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and Materials—a
market leader now in its ninth edition.3 It is no exaggeration to say that
Kadish had a huge impact on the teaching and scholarship of criminal law.
Multiple generations of scholars and polished pedagogues learned from
Kadish’s casebook as students and carried over its influence when they en-
tered the academy. Along with other early works in criminal law theory,
such as George Fletcher’s Rethinking Criminal Law,4 it is clear that the Kad-
ish casebook played an important role in the evolution of criminal law to its
present form. Among other things, it marshaled to the forefront the various
concepts that continue to dominate the teaching and research of criminal
law, including: the philosophical justifications for punishment and their use
as barometers for evaluating the morality of competing doctrines in sub-
stantive criminal law, the significance of justification and excuse as catego-
ries for understanding defenses, and the criminal law’s continuing struggles
to appropriately define causal criteria for certain offenses. While these dis-
cussions were already under way in the academy at the time, and thoroughly
debated by the American Law Institute during the adoption of Herbert
Wechsler’s Model Penal Code,5 Kadish brought these theoretical debates into
the classroom to educate a generation of future judges and scholars.
The brilliance of the Kadish approach stems from its introduction, early
in the semester, of the key philosophical ideas necessary for understanding
the criminal law. Chapter 1 begins with a foundational discussion of the
institutions and “processes” of the criminal law—the material from which
the book draws its famous title.6 This includes, among other things, a discus-
sion of presentation of evidence, burdens of proof (both production and
persuasion), standards of decision, and the role of the jury. The book then
moves in Chapter 2 to justifications for punishment, which require the stu-
dents to grapple with primary texts, including those from Bentham and
1. While some criminal law professors have a background in criminal law practice,
others have graduate-level training in philosophy, psychology, or political science—each of
which leads professors to approach the subject differently.
2. See Jens David Ohlin, Criminal Law: Doctrine, Application, and Practice
(2016).
3. See Sanford H. Kadish et al., Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and
Materials (9th ed. 2012).
4. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (1978).
5. See Model Penal Code (Am. Law Inst. 1962). For a good description of the Code’s
genesis, see Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097
(1952).
6. See Kadish et al., supra note 3, at 1–73.
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Kant.7 The goal of the materials is to force students to come to terms with
the competing moral paradigms of deontology and consequentialism and
map these competing moral frameworks onto modern theories of punish-
ment, including retributivism, general and specific deterrence, rehabilita-
tion, and incapacitation.8 Students discuss reasons for—and the methods
of—punishment; in so doing they build the necessary tools for understand-
ing the building blocks of society’s penal prohibitions.
Nonetheless, despite its undeniable role in shaping the practice and
study of the criminal law, Kadish et al. had its detractors. Some professors
less interested in criminal law theory and philosophy were dissatisfied with
the abstract nature of these materials in the long run-up to Chapter 4—on
rape—when the doctrine begins in earnest. Moreover, even among those
professors with an interest in theory or a background in philosophy, the
overtly philosophical nature of the introductory materials often generated
substantial complaints from students, many of whom asked, not entirely fa-
cetiously, whether they had taken a wrong turn at the campus quad and
ended up in the philosophy department instead of the law school. Of course,
student dissatisfaction need not be catered to when it is misguided, but
nonetheless some professors who assigned Kadish et al. to their students
were forced to listen to the whistling of the pages as the students frantically
searched for the doctrine they so clearly craved.
The landscape for criminal law casebooks changed in 1999 with the
publication of Joshua Dressler’s Cases and Materials on Criminal Law, now
in its sixth edition.9 Dressler’s brilliant text, with the recent introduction of
coauthor Stephen Garvey, is sometimes unfairly described as “Kadish-lite.”
To some, I suppose, that moniker is meant as a compliment. Dressler’s book
placed a premium on criminal law theory and a structural approach to un-
derstanding substantive criminal law. After a semester using Dressler & Gar-
vey, students can intuit, at both a macro- and micro-level, the so-called
tripartite structure of the criminal law: the material elements of the offenses
that prohibit unlawful conduct, the justifications that negate the wrongful-
ness of the act, and the excuses that negate the culpability of the individual
actors.10 After a semester, students understand why self-defense and neces-
sity are justifications, why duress is an excuse, and what implications these
7. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
reprinted in Kadish et al., supra note 3, at 91; Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law,
reprinted in Kadish et al., supra note 3, at 91–92; Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law,
reprinted in Kadish et al., supra note 3, at 93–95.
8. See Kadish et al., supra note 3, at 93–124.
9. Joshua Dressler & Stephen P. Garvey, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law
(6th ed. 2012).
10. For a discussion of the tripartite structure of the law, see 1 George P. Fletcher,
The Grammar of Criminal Law: American, Comparative, and International 328
(2007); Russell L. Christopher, Tripartite Structures of Criminal Law in Germany and Other
Civil Law Jurisdictions, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2675 (2007).
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categories might have for the fate of accomplices.11 All of it hangs together in
a beautiful picture of structure, doctrine, and theory, woven together in one
text. Like Kadish et al., Dressler and Garvey begin with introductory chap-
ters on the criminal process and the principles of punishment (including
materials from the dreaded Kant and Bentham),12 but the rest of the chap-
ters offer a clarity of presentation that some find wanting in Kadish et al. In
many of the subsequent chapters, the unapologetically philosophical ap-
proach of Kadish et al. is replaced by Dressler and Garvey’s light touch with
a discussion of the criminal law’s theoretical dimension. What remains is a
beautiful exegesis of law and theory that helps convince students of the
criminal law that theory matters, without hitting them over the head with it.
For many professors, this approach hits the spot, although some find its
theoretical orientation still too heavy for their classrooms and crave a more
doctrinal approach. On the other hand, some professors find that Dressler
and Garvey are sometimes too willing to characterize the law into a binary
opposition: the Model Penal Code (MPC) approach and the “common-law”
approach.13 While the Model Penal Code undoubtedly has an “approach” for
each topic of the substantive criminal law, it is doubtful whether anything
can be properly described as the “common-law” approach to any particular
issue of substantive criminal law. Indeed, even the term is confusing. If the
term is used in its historic sense, then yes, the “common-law” approach
might refer to how courts “at common law”—in England in, say, the
1800s—might have punished the behavior. But that is not what is meant by
a “common-law” approach in this context. Rather, the phrase is an attempt
to juxtapose the Model Penal Code with some non-MPC approach to which
the label “common law” is affixed.
This distillation of the criminal law into two categories—MPC versus
common law—is misleading because it falsely suggests that there are only
two avenues for each doctrinal fork in the road. Rather, for each issue, there
may be two options or there may be five, depending on the multiplicity of
standards or tests that courts and legislatures have deployed to solve that
particular problem. For example, the law of insanity is replete with a series
of tests: the M’Naghten cognitive test,14 the irresistible impulse addition to
the M’Naghten test, the Durham Product Test,15 the pure medical test used in
11. Dressler and Garvey include a nice case, United States v. Lopez, 662 F. Supp. 1083
(N.D. Cal. 1987), which gets students to understand that the necessity justification for a prison
break would also apply, by logical implication, to the accomplice of the prison break. See
Dressler & Garvey, supra note 9, at 864–66.
12. Dressler & Garvey, supra note 9, at 29–91.
13. See also Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 27–31 (6th ed. 2012)
(distinguishing the common-law approach to criminal law with the Model Penal Code).
14. M’Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (HL).
15. The Product Test was first articulated in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
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Norway,16 and the Model Penal Code’s combination of cognitive and voli-
tional tests with the additional overlay of a “substantial capacity” standard.17
This complex laundry list of tests and ideas is not helpfully arranged in an
MPC versus common law matrix. To even use this matrix is to suggest a
degree of coherence and singularity to the substantive criminal law of juris-
dictions that eschew the Model Penal Code. To add an even simpler level of
confusion: when the MPC sides with an older, supposedly common-law po-
sition, what shall we call it: common law or MPC? Indeed, the “common law
versus MPC” language is so pervasive among some hornbooks and commer-
cial outlines that it is nearly impossible to deprogram students from using
that language even when the professor actively discourages students from
carving up the landscape in this fashion.
Taken together, Kadish et al. and Dressler & Garvey share the largest
market share and their influence on the field shows. However, there are
other important offerings. Paul Robinson’s pathbreaking casebook, Criminal
Law: Case Studies and Controversies, offers the most distinct pedagogic ap-
proach to the study of the criminal law.18 Each chapter starts with a “case
study,” often drawn from newspaper articles and other media sources, about
a real crime. After reading a factual description of the crime written by
Robinson himself, students are then prompted to consult their own intu-
itions of justice to answer a series of questions regarding the proper resolu-
tion of the case and what punishment, if any, is warranted for the
perpetrator. Students are given a numerical scale to rank the amount of
punishment the wrongdoer deserves. After the presentation of the case-
study materials, the chapter typically includes a long set of statutes, culled
from both the local jurisdiction of the case study as well as the Model Penal
Code. Students are then given a short doctrinal, treatise-like presentation of
the key criminal law concepts, often followed by a very brief, highly edited,
presentation of an appellate case that discusses the issue. What is striking
about the organization of the materials is the degree to which the appellate
opinion is the least important aspect of the chapter and comes near the end.
The key aspects of each chapter are the case study, statutes, and doctrinal
presentation—all of which form an entryway into provocative classroom
discussion. Professors expecting to find a casebook of appellate opinions had
better look elsewhere.
In developing this innovative pedagogical approach, Robinson effec-
tively brings some of his scholarly insights into the classroom—an elegant
and profound marriage of scholarship and pedagogy that is all too rare in
today’s legal academy. Robinson and John Darley, along with a new genera-
tion of young psychologists trained by them, have pioneered the study of lay
16. For a defense of this test, see Michael S. Moore, The Quest for a Responsible Responsi-
bility Test: Norwegian Insanity Law After Breivik, Crim. L. & Phil. (2014).
17. Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) (Am. Law Inst. 1962).
18. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law: Case Studies and Controversies (3d ed.
2012).
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intuitions of justice. In various books and articles, Robinson and Darley ar-
gue that lay intuitions of justice are widely shared across cultural and politi-
cal contexts.19 What “regular people” believe about culpability,
blameworthiness, and punishment turns out to be relatively stable regardless
of their cultural or political locales.20 Or at least it is with regard to the
“core” of the criminal law—the essential doctrines that define the basic cate-
gories of the substantive criminal law. Moreover, Robinson and Darley argue
that legal systems are most effective when they embody and reflect these lay
intuitions.21 When legal systems substantially depart from them, a  host of
negative consequences flow that prevent the criminal law from realizing its
goals of norm compliance: people see the law as less legitimate and start
ignoring it.22 Regular people believe in moral desert—that people deserve to
be punished for their wrongdoing—but this desert has positive conse-
quences, an inner utility if you will. This is the utility of desert.23
So it is clear why Robinson should be so passionate about surveying his
students, early in each class session, about their intuitions of justice regard-
ing the particular legal issue, whether it is the dividing line between lawful
preparations and criminal attempts, or the type of intervening action that
will break the chain of causation in a case of reckless behavior. And it is
equally clear why Robinson’s approach would downgrade the significance of
appellate decisions and increase the use of case studies. Robinson’s profound
approach, however, also limits its flexibility: its methodology is baked into
the DNA of every chapter in a way that cannot be excised by professors who
prefer an alternative. Those professors who use Robinson’s casebook are
often fanatical supporters of his approach because it works for them. But for
those professors who do not wish to spend a significant amount of time
surveying and debating common intuitions of justice, the Robinson
casebook is not for them. Some professors—and indeed many students—
labor under the (perhaps false) assumption that they are not teaching or
learning the law if they are not reading cases. This may be an unexamined
assumption, but it is a pervasive one nonetheless.
Many professors hungry for a case-based approach have drifted toward
Wayne LaFave’s Modern Criminal Law: Cases, Comments and Questions.24 If
Robinson is hostile to the role of appellate decisions in criminal law
pedagogy, LaFave is the exact opposite: he goes all in with the case approach
to law teaching. Indeed, LaFave’s large casebook is almost all cases: each
19. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
20. See id. at 3–4 (“Social science research demonstrates that people’s intuitions of jus-
tice are quite nuanced and that, for the punishment of serious wrongdoing, our intuitions are
widely shared across societies and demographics.”).
21. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 453
(1997).
22. Id. at 471–77.
23. Id. at 488–97.
24. Wayne R. LaFave, Modern Criminal Law: Cases, Comments and Questions
(5th ed. 2011).
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chapter includes only a brief introduction followed by several lengthy cases,
each of which is followed by notes that often summarize or quote squib
cases. The subsections within each chapter—for example in the chapter on
mens rea, subsections on recklessness, negligence, and knowledge—have no
introductory text and move directly into the cases.25 The pedagogy seems
clear: learn the criminal law through its iconic cases. Where did all of the
original text go? The answer is LaFave’s treatise on substantive criminal
law,26 first started with Austin W. Scott, Jr. decades ago,27 and which now is
in its fifth edition under the sole authorship of LaFave. The treatise, which is
arguably the single most comprehensive treatise on the substantive criminal
law, is available in a three-volume practitioner edition in print and on
Westlaw, and a one-volume student “hornbook” edition—a label that hardly
gives the book enough credit for its rigor and sophistication (and length,
clocking in at a rather un-hornbook-like 1,293 pages in its most recent edi-
tion). LaFave’s treatise, a mainstay for judges and clerks writing appellate
decisions on criminal law, is arguably the most cited criminal law text ever.28
One effect of the treatise is that it liberated LaFave from including treatise-
like descriptions of the law in his casebook; they have been pushed into
another volume so that the casebook can be a pure casebook.
II. Four Problems in Criminal Law Teaching
Viewed globally, the current field of criminal law casebooks represents
an impressive collection of learning methods, though as a whole there are
still unmet needs for teachers who cannot find the right casebook with the
right ratios of cases to doctrine and theory to practice—in a flexible and
modular format that allows professors to teach the way they want to. Taken
as a whole, the following issues remain unresolved: cases selected for the
wrong reasons, problems of tact in rape and sexual assault materials, overre-
liance on law review excerpts to engage with theoretical controversies, and
excessive length.
A. Selection of Cases
Arguably the biggest question facing a casebook author, especially for a
new casebook as opposed to a legacy volume, is which cases to include, and
why. This raises a difficult and perhaps underexplored question of law
school pedagogy: What exactly do we hope to achieve in making our stu-
dents read cases? For many casebooks, the case opinion is included as a
vehicle for students to find the law—the doctrine and that jurisdiction’s
particular approach to it. In many cases, the opinions will also engage in
25. See id. at 140 (knowledge); id. at 156 (recklessness and negligence).
26. See Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d ed. 2003).
27. Id. at xi.
28. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Books Published Since 1978, 29 J. Legal
Stud. 397, 404–05 (2000) (listing a previous version of LaFave’s treatise as the thirteenth
most-cited legal text or treatise).
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statutory interpretation, philosophical or theoretical analysis, and policy de-
bates over which doctrine, standard, or test to adopt for any particular legal
issue. Occasionally, a case is included because it includes a rich fact pat-
tern—a new and innovative set of facts that might be difficult to handle
using the existing doctrine. These latter cases are truly interesting because
they require the student to take the doctrine and apply it to a new set of
facts. They also get the student thinking about advocacy, that is, how prose-
cutors and defense attorneys can convince a judge or jury of whether the
defendant’s conduct violated the statute. These cases are also the ones that
are most likely to stimulate an engaging and fruitful class discussion. Unfor-
tunately, the cases that involve such complex applications of the doctrine are
often the minority in a casebook.
Far too often, cases are selected because they announce the law rather
than apply the law to new and interesting facts. In some cases, the appellate
decisions strip away most of the interesting facts, and sometimes casebook
editors omit the facts entirely so all that remains is a legal analysis of the
doctrine. Indeed, in some cases the legal analysis within the case is heavily
doctrinal and practically treatise-like, except it is encased within the four
corners of an appellate decision instead of written by the casebook author.
Why use these cases? One frequent argument is that reading cases to find the
law teaches important legal research skills that students will need as practic-
ing attorneys. Whether working at a law firm or as a district attorney, young
attorneys will perform searches on Westlaw and Lexis and start reading
cases. In the process, they will need to learn how to pull out the law from a
large stack of appellate decisions.
This is an important legal research skill that all law students must
master, but it is unclear whether teaching criminal law should be mixed with
learning this skill. Almost every law school has a separate introductory class
on legal research and writing that teaches this skill. Furthermore, it is cer-
tainly not the case that practicing lawyers will be thrown into reading cases
without first consulting secondary literature. Indeed, even a practicing law-
yer would be well-advised to—and certainly does—consult LaFave’s treatise
on a given topic before starting to read cases and deepening his or her
knowledge regarding the approach taken by a specific jurisdiction. So it is
just false that legal research requires the reading of cases without any prior
doctrinal introduction to the subject.
This is not to say that casebooks always select cases simply because they
announce the law, and that casebooks never include “application” cases.
What is wrong is the ratio. Far too many cases are included as doctrinal
foils—a pure vehicle for throwing doctrine at students—instead of cases that
involve complex application to new and interesting fact patterns. Strangely
enough, this is what most professors test their students on at the end of the
semester: we give them a complex hypothetical or real fact pattern and ask
them to apply the law to it. If my experiences are any indication, 90 percent
of the students get the law exactly right. What distinguishes the A and B
exams is the quality of the analysis as the student applies the law to the given
fact pattern and argues why the prohibition should, or should not, apply to
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the given conduct. And this is what good lawyers need to do. So why don’t
we do more of this in our casebooks? Why don’t we select cases on this basis
instead of how well the case explains the doctrine? Here is a “radical” (not
really) idea: first give the students a lesson in the doctrine and then get them
to apply the doctrine to the facts of some really interesting cases. What flows
naturally from that exercise can then be tailored to the demands of the par-
ticular student cohort: either a normative and philosophical discussion
about which doctrinal solution works best under the circumstances, or a
more practice-oriented discussion of how the doctrine works on the ground
for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial judges.
In a sense, Robinson’s casebook is the best at encouraging this process
because it gets students to apply the law to new and interesting facts through
its innovative use of case studies. Robinson’s book is not more widely
adopted because students themselves perform the initial application of the
law to the case study, as opposed to an appellate decision. The value of the
appellate decision is that it gives students a baseline against which they can
react—an example of how one judicial body has applied the law, which stu-
dents can then critique and argue about how they might have applied the
law differently. It also provides students with a window into judicial deci-
sionmaking. In Robinson’s book, in contrast, the lack of an appellate opin-
ion for the students to react against forces the students to invent the
application process out of whole cloth. The Robinson approach is arguably
more appropriate, at least in the context of a psychological study, because it
does not contaminate the students’ initial reporting of their intuitions of
justice with an anchor (the appellate decision) that might sway their re-
sponses in one direction or another.29 But the point of a criminal law
casebook is not to generate a high-quality dataset but rather to produce
optimal pedagogical outcomes. Thus, many professors prefer to give stu-
dents an appellate decision to react to. As a final point, Robinson insists on
giving the students the case study first—and testing their reactions to it—
before giving them the actual doctrine. Again, for a psychological study that
approach gets it exactly right, but for a classroom experience, why not teach
them the law first and then have them apply it afterward?
B. Rape and Sexual Assault Materials
It is no secret that the study of rape and sexual assault law has grown
more difficult—and simultaneously more urgent—in the last decade. The
campus climate on these issues is increasingly charged, both politically and
legally, and some professors have responded by dropping the subject entirely
from their syllabi, or not testing it on their final exams.30 Putting aside the
29. See Adrian Furnham & Hua Chu Boo, A Literature Review of the Anchoring Effect, 40
J. Socio-Economics 35, 35 (2011).
30. For example, at least one notable casebook moves rape to the back of the book in a
section labeled “additional offenses” which includes, in addition to rape, chapters on theft and
perjury. See John Kaplan et al., Criminal Law: Cases and Materials 865 (7th ed. 2012).
This placement is optimal for professors who exclude the subject from their course.
1164 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1155
difficult question of crafting appropriate exam questions on the subject, it is
clear that the topic of sexual assault should be part of the classroom discus-
sion in a first-year criminal law class.31 First, rape provides an important
case study on the rapid evolution of the law—as various elements of the
doctrine, such as the resistance or force requirements, have either been
dropped or substantially redefined.32 This in itself is an important reason to
teach rape law. Second, rape provides an important case study in the com-
plexities of mens rea and how it relates to mistakes. Over time, jurisdictions
have changed how they view the crime’s mental element and which objective
elements it applies to. So, for example, it was once common to think that the
perpetrator must intend to have sex with the victim with knowledge that the
victim is not consenting.33 Now it is more common to think that the perpe-
trator must intend to have sex but that this mental element need not range
over the attendant circumstance of the victim’s lack of consent.34 This
change in conception in the law of rape helps students understand that they
need to carve up the material elements of the offense and figure out how
broadly, or narrowly, the mental element applies to them. Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, if the law remains unsatisfactory, either in its writ-
ten form or in its application in courtrooms across the country, the only
way to improve it is by educating a generation of practicing attorneys who
will apply their skills to triggering meaningful reform at the level of state
statutes or local prosecutions. None of this will happen if students are taught
that rape law is something to be avoided.35
While rape law should not be avoided in a criminal law classroom, it is
true that there is room for improvement. Some students continue to com-
plain about how the subject is handled in classroom discussions and in their
casebooks. I leave to the side the issue of classroom discussions, since that
depends on the dynamic of each class and the tenor of its discussions. But as
to casebooks, it is clear that at least some of these complaints in the past
31. For an argument for its continued importance in the criminal law curriculum, see
Jeannie Suk, The Trouble with Teaching Rape Law, New Yorker (Dec. 15, 2014), http://
www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trouble-teaching-rape-law http://perma.cc/6V2T-
AT7C] (“Now more than ever, it is critical that law students develop the ability to engage
productively and analytically in conversations about sexual assault.”).
32. See, e.g., State v. Jones, No. 36841, 2011 WL 4011738, at *5 (Idaho Ct. App. Sept. 12,
2011) (concluding that verbal resistance is sufficient to meet the statute’s resistance require-
ment although “legal decision-makers have historically ignored evidence of a woman’s verbal
resistance; under the law, verbal resistance was simply inadequate to prove anything”).
33. See, e.g., McQuirk v. State, 4 So. 775, 776 (Ala. 1888) (“The consent given by the
prosecutrix may have been implied as well as express, and the defendant would be justified in
assuming the existence of such consent if the conduct of the prosecutrix towards him at the
time of the occurrence was of such a nature as to create in his mind the honest and reasonable
belief that she had consented by yielding her will freely to the commission of the act.”).
34. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001) (“Although the
Commonwealth must prove lack of consent, the ‘elements necessary for rape do not require
that the defendant intend the intercourse be without consent.’ ” (quoting Commonwealth v.
Grant, 464 N.E.2d 33, 36 (Mass. 1984)).
35. See id.
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have been legitimate. Students have complained to me about appellate deci-
sions that linger far too long on the details of a sexual encounter, even when
the details are not relevant to resolving the crucial issues of the case and
addressing the factual and legal dispute over whether the material elements
are satisfied: the act of sex, the mental element of the perpetrator (whatever
it is under the applicable statute), and the consent of the victim. Occasion-
ally, the description of the facts of the case includes reference to the details
and mechanics of the victim’s or perpetrator’s sexual behavior that leads
some students to question whether the judges have a prurient interest in
their lengthy factual descriptions of the sexual encounter or assault.36 Are all
of these facts necessary? While this may sound like it cuts against what I said
above—that casebooks should get students to apply the law to new and un-
familiar fact patterns—these facts must be carefully selected. And it is not
unreasonable for students to insist that the descriptions of sexual assault
cases, whether hypothetical or real, be edited in such a way as to focus the
students on the facts that are relevant to the material elements of the of-
fense. It is true that students need to learn how to avoid irrelevant facts
because part of applying the law to new facts is arguing persuasively about
which facts are relevant and which are not. That being said, this pedagogic
value needs to be balanced against the legitimate needs of students who
would prefer not to read more details than necessary about a sexual assault.
C. Law Review Excerpts
The third aspect of criminal law casebooks that deserves consideration is
the widespread use of excerpts from law review articles to introduce students
to the theoretical or policy controversies embedded in the law. There is, of
course, wide disparity in their use among the casebooks. Both Kadish et al.
and Dressler and Garvey make heavy use of law review excerpts, as does
Robinson (in an appendix), but LaFave does not (concentrating on cases),
and a fifth option, Bonnie, Coughlin, Jeffries, and Low, does not favor law
review excerpts either.37 Kaplan et al. includes many law review excerpts,
though most are edited down to a few pages and are often clustered together
in conversation with each other.38 For casebooks that include the excerpts, it
is worth asking why they are an important vessel for classroom pedagogy. In
their favor, they give students a front-row seat to scholarly disputes regard-
ing the criminal law and help bridge the gap between scholarship and
pedagogy; they make scholarship simultaneously more relevant and more
accessible for students. Finally, they teach students how to read law review
articles—a source of law surely relevant to their legal research when they are
academics or practicing attorneys.
36. See, e.g., State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1267–69 (N.J. 1992); Commonwealth v.
Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1339–41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 641
A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
37. Richard J. Bonnie et al., Criminal Law (3d ed. 2010).
38. See, e.g., Kaplan et al., supra note 30, at 46–51, 52–57, 59–64, 68–70, 72–73,
74–77.
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On the other hand, law review excerpts can be clunky and inefficient
vessels for introducing students to a particular theoretical or policy problem.
Inevitably, the argument in the law review article is situated within a partic-
ular academic debate that may or may not match up with the particular
doctrinal or theoretical issue in that chapter. What is to be gained by using
the law review article? In its place, the casebook author can simply flesh out
the theoretical or policy debate without resorting to excerpting someone
else’s words. In that process, the casebook author can integrate the theoreti-
cal debate by referring back to materials already studied in that chapter—
other cases, other statutes—with the result being a holistic treatment of the
legal controversy in one set of materials.
As for what is lost by excluding law review excerpts, I argue that little
has been lost that cannot be made up elsewhere. While it is true that law
school students need to know how to read complex law review articles, it is
doubtful that exposure to heavily edited excerpts will accomplish the task.
Also, it is unclear whether a first- or second-semester doctrinal class is the
best place to do it. Better perhaps to defer the process of engaging with legal
scholarship in all of its complexity and glory into the second year of legal
education.
D. Excessive Lengths
Like many casebooks, criminal law casebooks are long. For example,
Robinson is 1,263 pages, Kadish et al. 1,308, Dressler & Garvey a compara-
tively compact 1,009, Bonnie & Coughlin 1,375, Kaplan et al. 1,121; LaFave
is 1,022 but with small margins. Should we be concerned? This is not just a
matter of preventing back problems among 1Ls or making sure that law
schools don’t have to invest in larger lockers to accommodate the rising girth
of student casebooks. There is a deeper, pedagogical reason to be worried.
Criminal law is almost always a three- or four-credit class in the first year of
law school. This makes criminal law different from contracts or civil proce-
dure, which some schools confine to a single semester but other schools have
kept the older model of two semesters for each subject. Substantive criminal
law (not procedure) is invariably a single-semester class. Even in a four-
credit class, most professors cannot hope to assign and complete a full
1,200-page casebook during the semester. Indeed, professors invariably only
assign a mere fraction of these casebooks—a process which requires profes-
sors to carve up the readings and materials into digestible chunks that fit
onto their syllabi. By itself this is not objectionable, but it leads to problem-
atic results because it forces the professor into the difficult dilemma of carv-
ing up the readings in an ad hoc and unsatisfying manner. Who better to
engage in this process: the individual instructor or the casebook author? The
latter could cut down the material into usable chunks so the casebook can be
taught in one semester with a coherent presentation of the material.
Of course, there are good reasons for individual teachers to include or
exclude certain readings, and these decisions have nothing to do with length.
One professor may wish to teach the death penalty while another may find
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the subject inessential. Another professor may find theft law theoretically
satisfying or necessary for preparing students for the bar exam, while an-
other teacher may consider it superfluous. These are all reasonable differ-
ences in syllabi, and a criminal casebook should accommodate them by
being slightly overinclusive, with the solution that those who do not wish to
teach some materials can leave them out. But some casebooks have taken
this process to an extreme by including so much material—and making it so
long—that professors are sometimes forced either to make cuts within a
chapter in awkward ways, or to leave out core topics due to time constraints,
neither of which are attractive options. The goal should be to produce a
casebook whose length is such that the majority of adopters—though not
all—can teach most of the book.
Several notable casebook authors in other areas have recognized this
problem and have recently published excellent condensed editions specifi-
cally designed for professors who find their unabridged versions unwieldy
and crave a single text that can be taught, for the most part, from cover to
cover in one semester. Two important examples of leading casebooks come
to mind. The first is Property: Concise Edition,39 and the second is Civil Pro-
cedure: Materials for a Basic Course.40 Having examined both, I found neither
watered down, unduly truncated, or in any way lacking in academic rigor.
(Indeed, in some sense they reinforce Mies van der Rohe’s minimalist edict
that less is more.) Instead, both casebooks simply recognize that a 1,200-
page casebook may not suit the needs of every professor at every law school.
When examined against this trend, the current criminal law casebooks are
behind the curve in their failure to recognize that length and classroom ex-
perience are related in important ways.
By writing a shorter criminal law casebook, whether an abridged or
original edition, are we kowtowing to unreasonable student demands for less
reading? Although there are legitimate concerns about turning law school
teaching into a consumer culture in which the student is “always right,” I
think the criticism is misplaced in this instance. When students carry
around a 1,200-page casebook and only cover a fraction of it during a se-
mester-long course that is designed to provide a systematic and comprehen-
sive introduction to the subject, they may leave the course anxious that their
introduction to the subject was incomplete. This anxiety, while perhaps ex-
aggerated, is not made up out of whole cloth. A shorter casebook allows the
professor to offer a comprehensive view of the subject rather than a piece-
meal introduction of only select topics. In a course like criminal law in
which structure is everything, with a dynamic and dialectical relationship
between the elements of the offenses, the modes of liability,41 and the justifi-
cations and excuses, a comprehensive approach to the subject is more than
39. Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property: Concise Edition (2014).
40. Richard H. Field et al., Civil Procedure: Materials for a Basic Course (con-
cise 11th ed. 2014).
41. The modes of liability are an essential part of the structure of the criminal law be-
cause they allow the court to link the defendant to the prohibited act. In other words, they
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salutary—it is downright necessary. This is not to say that students should
not be challenged by difficult or lengthy readings, but simply that we should
write casebooks whose length is tailored to the classes that we teach.
III. A New Approach
Given the existing offerings, it seems relatively clear that there is room
for a new entry into the field of criminal law casebooks. This statement is
not meant to criticize the existing offerings, but simply to recognize the bare
empirical fact that different professors have different teaching styles and the
current selection is not accommodating all of them. For that reason, in Jan-
uary 2016, Aspen published my casebook, Criminal Law: Doctrine, Applica-
tion, and Practice.42 I do not pretend that the casebook is superior in its
design or approach to the casebooks described above, although I do hope
that it responds to the needs of some professors who seek something they
cannot find in the current casebooks, or who receive complaints from their
students about the materials but cannot find a suitable alternative. In this
Part, I explain and justify the structure of my casebook and describe how its
design can accommodate a wide diversity of teaching styles.
The structure of Criminal Law: Doctrine, Application, and Practice is de-
signed to be modular and flexible.43 To that end, each chapter is much
shorter and covers a discrete topic—to enhance the ability of professors to
include or exclude topics as needed. So, for example, instead of having a
chapter on justifications and another on excuses, Criminal Law: Doctrine,
Application, and Practice has individual chapters on self-defense, defensive
force by police officers, necessity, duress, intoxication, and insanity. The re-
sult is twenty-seven chapters instead of the more typical twelve or thirteen.
This is more than just labeling. Although what counts as a chapter in my
casebook might simply be labeled as a subsection in Kadish et al. or Dressler
& Garvey, the shorter chapters make it easier for students and professors to
approach the material. Instead of a single chapter on homicide, there are
establish a culpable connection between the defendant’s wrongdoing (his participation, his aid-
ing and abetting, etc.) and the satisfaction of the material elements of the offense by someone
else. One can think of this process as a distinct aspect of the criminal law’s structure—which
would make it quadratic—or one can integrate it into the first node of the tripartite scheme.
The difference between these two options is largely formal.
42. Ohlin, supra note 2.
43. Luis Chiesa’s casebook also uses a modular design, with separate sections in each
chapter labeled “Scholarly Debates” and “Comparative Perspectives.” The first section briefly
canvasses how foreign jurisdictions treat an issue (with excerpts from foreign penal codes and
academic articles), while the second section includes excerpts from American law review arti-
cles. See Luis E. Chiesa, Substantive Criminal Law: Cases, Comments and Comparative
Materials (2014). Chiesa’s strategy of segregating these materials is a good idea because
many professors feel uncomfortable with the comparative approach or may wish to ignore the
law review excerpts in the Scholarly Debates section. That being said, Chiesa’s approach is
most attractive to professors who prefer to teach American criminal law by contrasting it with
foreign systems.
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discrete chapters on intentional killings, reckless killings, and negligent
killings.
Consider another example in which a large number of short chapters
might be useful. Casebook authors often have a difficult decision to make
about where to locate the materials on the conspiracy doctrine because con-
spiracy does double duty as an inchoate offense and as a mode of liability.
So one possibility is to include conspiracy along with other inchoate offenses
such as attempt and solicitation. This placement is less than ideal, however,
since conspiracy liability—including Pinkerton liability—is such a major as-
pect of the conspiracy doctrine.44 Because of that element of the conspiracy
doctrine, the other solution is to place conspiracy with the other modes of
liability dealing with accomplices. This would help students see the struc-
tural similarity between, say, the natural and probable consequences doc-
trine of accomplice liability and the reasonably foreseeable standard used for
Pinkerton liability. But this placement also sows confusion because it fails to
recognize the inchoate nature of conspiracy as a separate offense—an im-
portant policy discussion for the criminal law because it is the most aggres-
sive tool that prosecutors have for early intervention in burgeoning criminal
endeavors. The best solution is to carve up conspiracy into two short chap-
ters, one called Inchoate Conspiracy and the other called Conspiracy as
Mode of Liability, and place the former with the inchoate offenses and the
second adjacent to accomplice liability. This also helps segregate the theoret-
ical and policy discussions, which are really quite distinct from each other.
Casebooks are generally split on how to sequence the entire course.
Some, like Dressler & Garvey and Kaplan et al., place the affirmative de-
fenses right after the offenses of homicide and rape—and only afterward
move on to inchoate offenses and then end with modes of liability.45 Unfor-
tunately, Kadish et al., Dressler & Garvey, and Kaplan et al. all place theft at
the back of the book—segregated from the rest of the offenses. This move
signals theft’s status as an afterthought, something that no doubt irks serious
scholars of theft law, and seems designed to facilitate the removal of theft
from a professor’s syllabus.46 One other problem with Kadish et al. is that it
includes a very large chapter on group criminality that mixes complicity,
conspiracy, and corporate liability together in a way that might promote
confusion between inchoate conspiracy and conspiracy as a mode of
liability.47
44. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645–48 (1946) (upholding conspiracy
liability when crimes committed by coconspirators are in furtherance of the conspiracy and
are reasonably foreseeable).
45. See Dressler & Garvey, supra note 9, at xxiii–xxiv; Kaplan et al., supra note 30, at
ix–x (placing the chapters on justifications and excuses before the chapters on “attribution of
criminality”).
46. See supra note 45. In both Kaplan et al. and Dressler & Garvey, this has the unfortu-
nate effect of splitting up homicide, inchoate offenses, and theft (which comes near the end of
the book).
47. See Kadish et al., supra note 3, at xxi–xxiii.
1170 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1155
The better flow, which appears in Kadish et al. and others, is to start
with all of the offenses, proceed to inchoate offenses and modes of liability,
and finish the book with justifications and excuses.48 The reason for includ-
ing modes of liability after the offenses is that they remain an essential part
of the prosecutorial burden: to demonstrate that a crime was committed and
then link the defendant to that crime through some mode of liability. Then,
the materials can finish with justifications and excuses. The result mirrors
the tripartite structure of the criminal law: offenses, justifications, and ex-
cuses.49 Consequently, Part I of Criminal Law: Doctrine, Application, and
Practice lays out the basic elements of criminality and includes chapters on
the criminal process, punishment, the death penalty, foundational principles
of criminal law, the act requirement, mental states, mistakes, and causation.
Then, Part II lays out the offenses, with separate chapters for intentional
killings, voluntary manslaughter, reckless killings, felony murder, negligent
killings, rape, and theft. Part III examines the inchoate offenses, with sepa-
rate chapters for attempts, inchoate conspiracy, and solicitation. Part IV de-
tails the modes of liability, with chapters for accomplices, conspiracy
liability, and corporate crime. Finally, Part V divides up the justifications
and excuses into the following chapters: self-defense, defensive force by po-
lice officers, necessity, duress, intoxication, and insanity.
As for their internal structure, each chapter begins with a succinct ex-
planation of the doctrine for that particular legal concept. The goal of this
introductory section is to give students the basic doctrinal tools that estab-
lish the outer scope of the legal doctrine in question. There is nothing wrong
with providing doctrinal exegesis before students start attacking cases. Al-
though this might run counter to a pure vision of the Socratic Method—
give students nothing but cases and pose all statements to the class in the
form of a question—it seems to me that even the most Socratic teachers I
know are actually using a hybrid formula: some lecture, some Socratic ques-
tioning, some policy debates. It is fine for a casebook to reflect that. And
there is no reason for casebooks to fall victim to excessive hide-the-bal-
lism—as if making an actual doctrinal statement were vulgar.
Armed with this doctrinal introduction, the chapter then takes students
to the second section—the “Application” portion. In this section, the stu-
dents are asked to read one case for each major element of the doctrine that
requires them to apply the law to a given fact pattern and grapple with the
difficulties that such application necessarily involves. It is one thing to, for
example, declare in the abstract that a given jurisdiction follows the substan-
tial-step test for attempts, and quite another to gain fluency in the types of
legal arguments that would need to be deployed to convince a fact finder
that a defendant’s course of conduct satisfied—or failed to satisfy—the test.
Since the goal of reading the case is different—applying the law as op-
posed to finding it—cases have been selected with different criteria in mind.
48. See, e.g., id. at ix–xxx.
49. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Sometimes the case that first announces the doctrine is not terribly satisfy-
ing as an application of that doctrine. For example, Pinkerton v. United
States50 is the namesake case for conspiracy as a mode of liability, though the
facts are uninspiring (tax evasion) and do not clearly implicate the “reasona-
bly foreseeable consequences” aspect of the doctrine. Better to select a con-
temporary case involving an application of Pinkerton to a real-life scenario
that will engage the students in the difficulties posed by applying the doc-
trine to new facts. In some areas, the old case that announces the rule will
also be an excellent case for application. Dudley & Stephens is one example.51
Not only does Dudley & Stephens originate the rule that necessity is no de-
fense to murder,52 but it also provides a compelling factual scenario (canni-
balism at sea) to test our application of the rule. But in many situations, the
case that announces or distills the rule for the first time may not provide
such a compelling or educational application of it.
Another word about case selection is in order. The “canon” of classic
criminal law cases that forms the steady diet of our pedagogy has remained
unchanged over several generations. In some cases, their continued inclusion
is justified because the cases are excellent teaching tools. But many cases
could be replaced by newer ones that might engage the students with crimes
that happened during their young lives. Indeed, the criminal law has no
shortage of new cases—every year includes new front-page depravities that
involve complex and difficult applications of the very legal doctrines that we
teach in class. Why not make use of them in our teaching?
For that reason, every chapter also includes, toward the end of the appli-
cation section, brief “problem cases” ripped from the headlines. These prob-
lem cases, often just a few paragraphs, are unaccompanied by an appellate
decision. They offer students the opportunity to apply the doctrine without
the safety net of an appellate decision. But because of their short length—
and because they are set as sidebars—they are logically separate and could
be discussed in class, or not, depending on the needs and desires of the
individual professor. In that sense, the problem cases are designed to be
completely modular—a value-added component that could be the focus of
classroom discussion, or dispensed with entirely without any loss of coher-
ence to the overall material.
Each chapter then ends with a “Practice & Policy” section. These brief
materials are designed to take the student’s engagement with the material to
the next level. These materials ask students to consider the implications for
50. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
51. Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, [1884] 14 QBD 273 (Eng.) (necessity argument un-
available to shipwrecked sailors who resorted to murder and cannibalism).
52. See Michele Cotton, The Necessity Defense and the Moral Limits of Law, 18 New
Crim. L. Rev. 35, 39 (2015) (“[T]he Dudley and Stephens court did not even allow for a lawful
struggle between sailor and sailor, but defined the moral duty more sweepingly, suggesting
some general concept of self-sacrifice, perhaps Christian in nature, which greatly limited if not
eliminated any necessity defense available to defendants.”).
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practice, such as the strategic decisions that prosecutors and defense attor-
neys might face depending on how their jurisdictions approach that particu-
lar legal issue. The Practice & Policy section also allows for deeper
consideration of underlying policy questions that might animate how a
lawmaker should approach the question. The placement of these materials at
the end of the chapter is designed to promote their modularity. Some
professors will find this speculative material the most engaging in the chap-
ter; while some students may find the material so challenging or advanced
that their professors may wish to downplay its significance and not focus
classroom discussion around it. The bottom line is that law school students
are not all the same—what works at one law school may not work at an-
other, and professors favor different methodologies. The goal of Criminal
Law: Doctrine, Application, and Practice is to get students to understand the
doctrine and skillfully apply it, all in a flexible and modular format that does
not demand that every professor adopt the same methodology.
